DONNELLAN REFERENCE AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS PDF

February 6, 2021   |   by admin

Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. 1] They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite. Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Due Feb 13, by 10am; Points 5; Submitting a discussion post; Available after Feb 2, at 12am. Keith Sedgwick Donnellan was an American philosopher and Professor ” Reference and Definite Descriptions” has been one of.

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Alternatively, if Hawthorne and Manley are correct, the true mistake would have come in at the beginning—with the linking of acquaintance and reference.

Suppose that we respond to deecriptions principled basis objection by letting many flowers bloom. It would follow that descriptions need not be relied upon as heavily as he imagined. Oxford University Press, 68— One problem has to do with the fact that there is often no single shared description for certain fictions.

Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”

From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy jstor. Descriptivism holds that ordinary proper names e. The problem is that the Russellian analysis seems to turn a contingent proposition into a necessary proposition. As we will see, all of these claims can be put under pressure, and all three arguably collapse under that pressure. Of course, having referred to it, we presumably will then ascribe some properties to it. Ordinarily, when philosophers talk about descriptions, they have two kinds of expressions in mind: I believe this can point can be made for other modals as well.

University of Minnesota Press, 6— What Remains of the Theory of Descriptions? Reprinted in Mysticism and LogicLondon: See BachNeale band Lepore for a more general dicussion of the proposal.

One of the arguments that Strawson enlisted on behalf of the nad theory of descriptions was the following. On an event-based analysis of conditionals, we would expect a treatment of 19 along the lines of As Donnellan notes in section V, this latter point qualifies the earlier one about presuppositions p.

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Keith Donnellan

Conversational Implicatures and How to Spot Them. Views Read Edit View history. Fortunately there only appears to be one cheater. On the other hand, once the free variables are interpreted the effect comes to very much the same thing: For linguists it is now standard to think of indefinite descriptions following the copula as always being predicational, and it is a widespread belief that definite descriptions following the copula are often predicational.

But one wonders how legitimate a domain-shift analysis is here. The chapter then examines the theories of Bertrand Russell and Peter Strawson regarding definite descriptions, saying that there is something wrong with their theories.

He talks of the thing that is “meant”; of something that the speaker has “in mind”. There are obviously two responses to Strawson here.

Print Save Cite Email Share. Naming and NecessityCambridge, MA: For Reinhartchoice functions by themselves cannot account for the extant phenomena in particular cases of intermediate scopeso the theory must be supplemented with standard quantifier raising accounts as well. But genitive case can be put to other uses. Genoveva Marti – – Dialectica 62 1: Michael Blome-Tillmann – – Philosophy Compass 8 2: For Kripkeand Devitt this sort of approach was hopelessly circular.

Situations and IndividualsCambridge, MA: Indeed, many synonyms customarily donenllan put to different uses. A2 An indefinite NP in rrference argument position, however, ends anc denoting an individual, because the semantics involves a free function variable that assigns an individual to the restriction predicate.

Setting aside the question of whether these examples offer a case against familiarity, they are not, by themselves, evidence for uniqueness.

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This also raises the question of how far one can press the case based on examples like Consider cases like 38 38 I put the book on the book. Eonnellan names cannot be rigidified descriptions.

New Essays on the Foundations of OntologyOxford: Kripke – – In Peter A.

Reference and Definite Descriptions – Oxford Scholarship

Very few natural languages have what we would recognize as definite and indefinite descriptions. In this instance not only does the teacher fail to know the identity of the cheater, but also fails to know whether or not there was a unique cheater perhaps there were several.

At best the Russellian can argue that others are in the same boat here. The motivation for this idea would be as follows. He seems to want to deny that any “statement” is made in such cases i.

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The two-level theory thus accounts descfiptions our conflicting intuitions. Consider 19for example, and a paraphrase 20 in which the pronoun is rendered as a description.

Paul Elbourne – – Linguistics and Philosophy 33 1: Extending the Sharvy analysis of plural descriptions, we get the following, where F is the set of all F s, or descriotions mass of all substance that is F the vertical strokes before ad after and after the expression indicate that we are talking connellan the semantic value, or meaning, of the bordered expression:.

One is implying or presupposing that something fits the description uniquely. This free variable might then be picked up by some sort of discourse operator as discussed in the previous section.